Analysis of Narendra Modi's signature

In the past few years, very few Indian politicians have been trashed or won accolades like Gujarat chief minister Narendra Modi. Clearly, he is one of the most controversial persons in India. A lot has been written against Modi and his handling of the post-Godhra scenario.

He has been called the modern-day Hitler. On the other hand, it is also said that there is no better performer than Narendra Modi in India’s political structure. In fact Gujarat’s achievements in the past few years are often attributed to the efforts made by him.

But we are not here to decide whether we should side with someone who abuses him or someone who showers praises on him. We won’t conclude whether things that are said about him are true or not. Here, we will just analyse Modi’s signature. I would like to add here that I have not seen a signature like Modi's. Anyway, here are a few points I have made about his signature.

Illegible signature: If we did not have his full name written under his signature, is there any way we could have figured out that it is Narendra Modi’s handwriting sample? Nope. Such signatures are illegible. Legible means the writer is interested in communicating, illegible means they are not. In general, an illegible signature reveals a desire to be seen but not known, keeping things private. Illegible handwriting in combination with other specific traits may indicate dishonesty, but there are a lot of variables.

Lack of readability: If all letters in a signature are readable, then the writer's feelings are readable. Such person will not be able to hide his feelings. Even if such a person tries to hide dissemble his feelings, they will be revealed by the expressions on his face. His activities — good, bad or ugly — cannot remain unknown for a long time. Modi's signature is not readable. So, it's likely he does not have all these traits.

Letters missing: According to graphology, if some of the letters are missing in a signature, it indicates that the person always tries to avoid any dialogue on a few matter of his life.

Secretive circle: The second thing that stands out in his signature is the big circle around the first letter of his name. This indicates that the writer wants to keep his true identity hidden. They guard their secrets and it is very difficult to know the truth about such people. Many questions about such writers’ lives are just a subject of speculations.

Camouflaged first name: This reflects Modi’s tendency to be over-protective about himself. Circles around the first name shows the person gets very defensive in public. Such writers have a problem making friends because they do not open up and are always scared of getting hurt. They suspect the motives of people around them, which results in their social isolation.

Two dots at the right end: The dots indicate that Modi likes to have the final word in whatever he does. The two dots also suggest that he does not like others’ intervention and keeps all suggestions at bay.

How Narendra Modi played his part in Kar‘Nataka’

While the chief minister and his partymen are rejoicing at winning Thursday’s trust vote, it is instructive to know that the state BJP was provided with a measure of comfort in a nail-biting situation by none other than Gujarat chief minister Narendra Modi. If it had not been for Modi’s cooperation, the state BJP would have been hard-pressed to hang on to JDS MLA (Channapatna) M C Ashwath and make him abstain from voting against the government. Where the Congress and the JDS sequestered the BJP’s 11 rebel MLAs and the five independents at resorts in Tamil Nadu, Andhra Pradesh, Maharashtra and Goa – all ruled by UPA constituent parties – the BJP, courtesy Modi, kept Ashwath at an undisclosed location in Gujarat. No problem in gujarat A senior minister in Yeddyurappa’s cabinet said, “If we had kept him in a resort in Maharashtra, or Tamil Nadu, or Andhra Pradesh, or Goa, the ruling parties there would have got to him. After he went briefly to Tamil Nadu, we took him to Gujarat.” He added, “When our party teams went to these states to talk to the dissidents, the governments there threatened us with arrest. But in Gujarat, there was no problem.” Ashwath, who arrived in the city late on Thursday evening, submitted his resignation to the speaker, K G Bopaiah. He was accompanied by home minister R Ashoka, tourism minister Janardhana Reddy and BJP MLA (Surpur) Raju Gowda. With his resignation, the JDS strength is down to 27 in the assembly. Meanwhile, hinting at a renewed Operation Lotus, state BJP chief KS Eshwarappa has said that the BJP would welcome any MLA who is willing to join the party and abide by its ideology.

Engaging Modi the U.S. way

PTI Facing the possibility of Gujarat Chief Minister Narendra Modi assuming a leadership role at the national level, the State Department sanctioned meetings in 2006 at the level of the Mumbai Consul General. File photo

Confidential 2006 cable reveals complex calculations in the event of the Gujarat Chief Minister ‘making it to the national stage'; wants a clear message delivered on U.S. concerns over 'human rights and religious freedom'

Having declined to engage with him at the ambassadorial level because of his role in the 2002 Gujarat communal violence and anti-Muslim pogrom, U.S. diplomats found themselves, in 2006, facing the possibility of Gujarat Chief Minister Narendra Modi assuming a leadership role at the national level. Conscious that the United States would have to deal with him at a later stage if he rose in stature on the national stage, the State Department evidently sanctioned meetings at the level of the Mumbai Consul General on the understanding that such interactions would also enable the U.S. to deliver a “clear message on human rights and religious freedom in Gujarat.”

In a cable dated November 2, 2006 ( the Consul General in Mumbai, Michael S. Owen, underscored the importance of interacting with Mr. Modi “whose B1/B2 visa we revoked in 2005, at the level of the Consul General” over the Chief Minister's role in the 2002 communal violence. Such interaction, Mr. Owen said, “will also shield us from accusations of opportunism from the BJP that would invariably arise if we ignored Modi now but sought a dialogue with him in the likely event that he makes it to the national stage.”

On the basis of discussions with leaders of the Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh and the Bharatiya Janata Party, the Mumbai Consulate concluded that Mr. Modi had set his sights on national politics. Interestingly, many in the BJP leadership believed that the Gujarat Chief Minister was the “only person of the BJP's many aspiring leaders who can reinvigorate the party and stop its further slide into oblivion.”

While there was no consensus on Mr. Modi's chances for success at the national level, some in Delhi and Gujarat strongly felt that his rise was inevitable, Mr. Owen added.

The Mumbai Consulate's 2,850-word assessment, which was cleared by the New Delhi Embassy before being cabled to the State Department, was carefully considered, nuanced, and telling. The disquisition could well form the core of an M.A. thesis in politics:

“If Modi does eventually get a national leadership role in the BJP in the foreseeable future, the USG [United States Government] will be obliged to decide how it wants to deal with a figure of national prominence whose B1/B2 we revoked. We believe it would dilute our influence to avoid Modi completely. If we waited to engage Modi after he attains national stature within India's largest and most important opposition party, many in the BJP would likely view this as an opportunistic move and only deepen the suspicions cultivated by some BJP leaders in western India since the visa revocation.

“Since the riots of 2002, we have declined to engage Modi at the Ambassadorial level, but Mumbai Consul Generals have routinely sought meetings with Modi whenever they visited Ahmedabad. We will continue to seek such meetings at the level of the CG to emphasize that the USG does not have a formal no-contact policy… and to demonstrate to the BJP that we are interested in cultivating relationships with the party while it is in the opposition. Direct encounters with Modi will also enable us to deliver a clear message regarding USG concerns for the state of human rights and religious freedom in Gujarat.”

On Mr. Modi's strengths as Chief Minister that could aid his national leadership ambitions, Mr. Owen's analysis was: “Modi has successfully branded himself as a non-corrupt, effective administrator, as a facilitator of business in a state with a deep commercial culture, and as a no-nonsense, law-and-order politician who looks after the interests of the Hindu majority. Modi's backers in the BJP now hope to convince the party leadership that he can use these positive traits to attract voters throughout India. Some BJP leaders believe, or hope, that voters will forget or forgive Modi's role in the 2002 bloodshed, once they learn to appreciate his other qualities.”

Not ‘if' but ‘when’

The Consul General quoted Harin Pathak, a BJP Member of Parliament from Gujarat, as saying that the BJP national leadership, and particularly former Deputy Prime Minister L.K. Advani, were convinced that only Mr. Modi could rejuvenate the party. Ram Madhav of the RSS also voiced similar views, “going so far as to say that Modi's ascendancy is not a question of if but when, and the USG must start considering now how it will deal with Modi when he becomes head of the BJP and leads the party's electoral campaign in the national elections scheduled for 2009.”

Mr. Owen also drew attention to what he saw as divergence between Mr. Modi's public image and his private actions. “In public appearances, Modi can be charming and likeable. By all accounts, however, he is an insular, distrustful person who rules with a small group of advisors. This inner circle acts as a buffer between the Chief Minister and his cabinet and party. He reigns more by fear and intimidation than by inclusiveness and consensus, and is rude, condescending and often derogatory to even high level party officials. He hoards power and often leaves his ministers in the cold when making decisions that affect their portfolios.”